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Abstract
We introduce the concept of control centrality to quantify the ability of a single node to control
a directed weighted network. We calculate the distribution of control centrality for several real
networks and find that it is mainly determined by the network’s degree distribution. We rigor-
ously prove that in a directed network without loops the control centrality of a node is uniquely
determined by its layer index or topological position in the underlying hierarchical structure of
the network. Inspired by the deep relation between control centrality and hierarchical structure
in a general directed network, we design an efficient attack strategy against the controllability of
malicious networks.
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Complex networks have been at the forefront of statistical mechanics for more than a
decade [1–4]. Studies of them impact our understanding and control of a wide range of
systems, from Internet and the power-grid to cellular and ecological networks. Despite the
diversity of complex networks, several basic universal principles have been uncovered that
govern their topology and evolution [3, 4]. While these principles have significantly enriched
our understanding of many networks that affect our lives, our ultimate goal is to develop
the capability to control them [5–17].
According to control theory, a dynamical system is controllable if, with a suitable choice
of inputs, it can be driven from any initial state to any desired final state in finite time [18–
20]. By combining tools from control theory and network science, we proposed an efficient
methodology to identify the minimum sets of driver nodes, whose time-dependent control can
guide the whole network to any desired final state [12]. Yet, this minimum driver set (MDS)
is usually not unique, but one can often achieve multiple potential control configurations
with the same number of driver nodes. Given that some nodes may appear in some MDSs
but not in other, a crucial question remains unanswered: what is the role of each individual
node in controlling a complex system? Therefore the question that we address in this paper
pertains to the importance of a given node in maintaining a system’s controllability.
Consider a complex system described by a directed weighted network of N nodes whose
time evolution follows the linear time-invariant dynamics
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (1)
where x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xN(t))T ∈ RN captures the state of each node at time t.
A ∈ RN×N is an N ×N matrix describing the weighted wiring diagram of the network. The
matrix element aij ∈ R gives the strength or weight that node j can affect node i. Positive
(or negative) value of aij means the link (j → i) is excitatory (or inhibitory). B ∈ RN×M
is an N ×M input matrix (M ≤ N) identifying the nodes that are controlled by the time
dependent input vector u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t), · · · , uM(t))T ∈ RM with M independent signals
imposed by an outside controller. The matrix element bij ∈ R represents the coupling
strength between the input signal uj(t) and node i. The system (1), also denoted as (A,B),
is controllable if and only if its controllability matrix C = (B,AB, · · · ,AN−1B) ∈ RN×NM
has full rank, a criteria often called Kalman’s controllability rank condition [18]. The rank of
the controllability matrix C, denoted by rank(C), provides the dimension of the controllable
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subspace of the system (A,B) [18, 19]. When we control node i only, B reduces to the vector
b(i) with a single non-zero entry, and we denote C with C(i). We can therefore use rank(C(i))
as a natural measure of node i’s ability to control the system: if rank(C(i)) = N , then node
i alone can control the whole system, i.e. it can drive the system between any points in the
N -dimensional state space in finite time. Any value of rank(C(i)) less than N provides the
dimension of the subspace i can control. In particular if rank(C(i)) = 1, then node i can
only control itself.
The precise value of rank(C) is difficult to determine because in reality the system pa-
rameters, i.e. the elements of A and B, are often not known precisely except the zeros
that mark the absence of connections between components of the system [21]. Hence A and
B are often considered to be structured matrices, i.e. their elements are either fixed zeros
or independent free parameters [21]. Apparently, rank(C) varies as a function of the free
parameters of A and B. However, it achieves the maximal value for all but an exceptional
set of values of the free parameters which forms a proper variety with Lebesgue measure
zero in the parameter space [22, 23]. This maximal value is called the generic rank of the
controllability matrix C, denoted as rankg(C), which also represents the generic dimension
of the controllable subspace. When rankg(C) = N , the system (A,B) is structurally con-
trollable, i.e. controllable for almost all sets of values of the free parameters of A and B
except an exceptional set of values with zero measure [21, 22, 24, 25]. For a single node i,
rankg(C
(i)) captures the “power” of i in controlling the whole network, allowing us to define
the control centrality of node i as
Cc(i) ≡ rankg(C(i)). (2)
The calculation of rankg(C) can be mapped into a combinatorial optimization problem
on a directed graph G(A,B) constructed as follows [23]. Connect the M input nodes
{u1, · · · , uM} to the N state nodes {x1, · · · , xN} in the original network according to the
input matrix B, i.e. connect uj to xi if bij 6= 0, obtaining a directed graph G(A,B) with
N +M nodes (see Fig. 1a and b). A state node j is called accessible if there is at least one
directed path reaching from one of the input nodes to node j. In Fig. 1b, all state nodes
{x1, · · · , x7} are accessible from the input node u1. A stem is a directed path starting from
an input node, so that no nodes appear more than once in it, e.g. u1 → x1 → x5 → x7 in
Fig. 1b. Denote with Gs the stem-cycle disjoint subgraph of G(A,B), such that Gs consists
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of stems and cycles only, and the stems and cycles have no node in common (highlighted
in Fig. 1b). According to Hosoe’s theorem[23], the generic dimension of the controllable
subspace is given by
rankg(C) = max
Gs∈G
|E(Gs)| (3)
with G the set of all stem-cycle disjoint subgraphs of the accessible part of G(A,B) and
|E(Gs)| the number of edges in the subgraph Gs. For example, the subgraph highlighted
in Fig. 1b, denoted as Gmaxs , contains the largest number of edges among all possible stem-
cycle disjoint subgraphs. Thus, Cc(1) = rankg(C
(1)) = 6, which is the number of red links in
Fig. 1b. Note that rankg(C
(1)) = 6 < N = 7, the whole system is therefore not structurally
controllable by controlling x1 only. Yet, the nodes covered by the G
max
s highlighted in Fig. 1b,
e.g. {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x7}, constitute a structurally controllable subsystem [25]. In other
words, by controlling node x1 with a time dependent signal u1(t) we can drive the subsystem
{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x7} from any initial state to any final state in finite time, for almost all
sets of values of the free parameters of A and B except an exceptional set of values with
zero measure. In general Gmaxs is not unique. For example, in Fig. 1b we can get the same
cycle x2 → x3 → x4 → x2 together with a different stem u1 → x1 → x5 → x6, which yield a
different Gmaxs and thus a different structurally controllable subsystem {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}.
Both subsystems are of size six, which is exactly the generic dimension of the controllable
subspace. Note that we can fully control each subsystem individually, yet we cannot fully
control the whole system.
The advantage of Eq.(3) is that maxGs∈G |E(G)| can be calculated via linear program-
ming [26], providing us an efficient numerical tool to determine the control centrality and
the structurally controllable subsystem of any node in an arbitrary complex network (see
Supplementary Material Sec.I.A).
We first consider the distribution of control centrality. Shown in Fig. 2 is the distribution
of the normalized control centrality (cc(i) ≡ Cc(i)/N) for several real networks. We find
that for the intra-organization network, P (cc) has a sharp peak at cc = 1, suggesting that
a high fraction of nodes can individually exert full control over the whole system (Fig. 2a).
In contrast, for company-ownership network, P (cc) follows an approximately exponential
distribution (Fig. 2d), indicating that most nodes display low control centrality. Even the
most powerful node, with cc ∼ 0.01, can control only one percent of the total dimension of the
system’s full state space. For other networks P (cc) displays a mixed behavior, indicating the
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coexistence of a few powerful nodes with a large number of nodes that have little control over
the system’s dynamics (Fig. 2b,c). Note that under full randomization, turning a network
into a directed Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random network [27, 28] with number of nodes (N) and
number of edges (L) unchanged, the cc distribution changes dramatically. In contrast, under
degree-preserving randomization [29, 30], which keeps the in-degree (kin) and out-degree
(kout) of each node unchanged, the cc distribution does not change significantly. This result
suggests that P (cc) is mainly determined by the underlying network’s degree distribution
P (kin, kout). This result is very useful in the following sense: P (kin, kout) is easy to calculate
for any complex network, while the calculation of P (cc) requires much more computational
efforts (both CPU time and memory space). Studying P (cc) for model networks of prescribed
P (kin, kout) will give us qualitative understanding of how P (cc) changes as we vary network
parameters, e.g. mean degree 〈k〉. See Supplementary Material Sec.II for more details.
To understand which topological features determine the control centrality itself, we com-
pared the control centrality for each node in the real networks and their randomized coun-
terparts (denoted as rand-ER and rand-Degree). The lack of correlations indicates that both
randomization procedures eliminate the topological feature that determines the control cen-
trality of a given node (see Supplementary Material Sec.I.B). Since accessibility plays an
important role in maintaining structural controllability [21], we conjecture that the control
centrality of node i is correlated with the number of nodes Nr(i) that can be reached from it.
To test this conjecture, we calculated Nr(i) and Cc(i) for the real networks shown in Fig. 2,
observing only a weak correlation between the two quantities (see Supplementary Material
Sec.I.C). This lack of correlation between Nr(i) and Cc(i) is obvious in a directed star, in
which a central hub (x1) points to N − 1 leaf nodes (x2, · · · , xN) (Fig. 1c). As the central
hub can reach all nodes, Nr(1) = N , suggesting that it should have high control centrality.
Yet, one can easily check that the central hub has control centrality Cc(1) = 2 for any N ≥ 2
and there are N − 1 structurally controllable subsystems, i.e. {x1, x2}, · · · , {x1, xN−1}. In
other words, by controlling the central hub we can fully control each leaf node individually,
but we cannot control them collectively.
Note that in a directed star each node can be labeled with a unique layer index : the
leaf nodes are in the first layer (bottom layer) and the central hub is in the second layer
(top layer). In this case the control centrality of the central hub equals its layer index (see
Fig. 1c). This is not by coincidence: we can prove that for a directed network containing
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no cycles, often called a directed acyclic graph (DAG), the control centrality of any node
equals its layer index
Cc(i) = li. (4)
Indeed, lacking cycles, a DAG has a unique hierarchical structure, which means that each
node can be labeled with a unique layer index (li), calculated using a recursive labeling
algorithm [31]: (1) Nodes that have no outgoing links (kout = 0) are labeled with layer index
1 (bottom layer). (2) Remove all nodes in layer 1. For the remaining graph identify again all
nodes with kout = 0 and label them with layer index 2. (3) Repeat step (2) until all nodes
are labeled. As the DAG lacks cycles, each subgraph in the set G of the directed graph
G(A,b(i)) consists of a stem only, which starts from the input node pointing to the state
node i and ends at a state node in the bottom layer, e.g. u1 → x1 → x2 → x4 in Fig. 1d. The
number of edges in this stem is equal to the layer index of node i, so rankg(C
(i)) = Cc(i) = li.
Therefore in DAG the higher a node is in the hierarchy, the higher is its ability to control
the system. Though this result agrees with our intuition to some extent, it is surprising
at the first glance because it indicates that in a DAG the control centrality of node i is
only determined by its topological position in the hierarchical structure, rather than any
other importance measures, e.g. degree or betweenness centrality. This result also partially
explains why driver nodes tend to avoid hubs [12].
Despite the simplicity of Eq. (4), we cannot apply it directly to real networks, because
most of them are not DAGs. Yet, we note that any directed network has a underlying DAG
structure based on the strongly connected component (SCC) decomposition (see Supplemen-
tary Material Sec.I.D Fig. S4). A subgraph of a directed network is strongly connected if
there is a directed path from each node in the subgraph to every other node. The SCCs of a
directed network G are its maximal strongly connected subgraphs. If we contract each SCC
to a single supernode, the resulting graph G˜, called the condensation of G, is a DAG [32].
Since a DAG has a unique hierarchical structure, a directed network can then be assigned an
underlying hierarchical structure. The layer index of node i can be defined to be the layer
index of the corresponding supernode (i.e. the SCC that node i belongs to) in G˜. With this
definition of li, it is easy to show that Cc(i) ≥ li for general directed networks. Furthermore,
for an edge (i → j) in a general directed network, if node i is topologically “higher” than
node j (i.e. li > lj), then Cc(i) > Cc(j). Since Cc(i) has to be calculated via linear pro-
gramming which is computationally more challenging than the calculation of li, the above
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results suggest an efficient way to calculate the lower bound of Cc(i) and to compare the
control centralities of two neighboring nodes. Note that if li > lj and there is no directed
edge (i → j) in the network, then in general one cannot conclude that Cc(i) > Cc(j) (see
Supplementary Material Sec.I.D for more details).
Our finding on the relation between control centrality and hierarchical structure inspires
us to design an efficient attack strategy against malicious networks, aiming to affect their
controllability. The most efficient way to damage the controllability of a network is to
remove all input nodes {u1, u2, · · · , uM}, rendering the system completely uncontrollable.
But this requires a detailed knowledge of the control configuration, i.e. the wiring diagram
of G(A,B), which we often lack. If the network structure (A) is known, one can attempt
a targeted attack, i.e. rank the nodes according to some centrality measure, like degree
or control centrality, and remove the nodes with highest centralities [33, 34]. Though we
still lack systematic studies on the effect of a targeted attack on a network’s controllability,
one naively expects that this should be the most efficient strategy. But we often lack the
knowledge of the network structure, which makes this approach unfeasible anyway. In this
case a simple strategy would be random attack, i.e. remove a randomly chosen P fraction
of nodes, which naturally serves as a benchmark for any other strategy. Here we propose
instead a random upstream attack strategy: randomly choose a P fraction of nodes, and for
each node remove one of its incoming or upstream neighbors if it has one, otherwise remove
the node itself. A random downstream attack can be defined similarly, removing the node
to which the chosen node points to. In undirected networks, a similar strategy has been
proposed for efficient immunization [34] and the early detection of contagious outbreaks [35],
relying on the statistical trend that randomly selected neighbors have more links than the
node itself [36, 37]. In directed networks we can prove that randomly selected upstream
(or downstream) neighbors have more outgoing (or incoming) links than the node itself
(see Supplementary Material Sec.III.A). Thus a random upstream (or downstream) attack
will remove more hubs and more links than the random attack does. But the real reason
why we expect a random upstream attack to be efficient in a directed network is because
Cc(i) ≥ Cc(j) for most edges (i → j), i.e. the control centrality of the starting node is
usually no less than the ending node of a directed edge. In DAGs, for any edge (i → j),
we have strictly Cc(i) > Cc(j) (see Supplementary Material Sec.III.B). Thus, the upstream
neighbor of a node is expected to play a more important or equal role in control than the
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node itself, a result deeply rooted in the nature of the control problem, rather than the hub
status of the upstream nodes.
To show the efficiency of the random upstream attack we compare its impact on fully
controlled networks with several other strategies. We start from a network that is fully
controlled (rankg(C) = N) via a minimum set of ND driver nodes. After the attack a P
faction of nodes are removed, denoting with rankg(C
′) the dimension of the controllable
subspace of the damaged network. We calculate rankg(C
′) as a function of P , with P
tuned from 0 up to 1. Since the random attack serves as a natural benchmark, we calculate
the difference of rankg(C
′) between a given strategy and the random attack, denoted as
δ = [rankStrategy−jg (C
′) − rankRandomg (C′)]/N . Apparently, the more negative is δ, the more
efficient is the strategy compared to a fully random attack. We find that for most networks
random upstream attack results in δ < 0 for 0 < P < 1, i.e. it causes more damage to the
network’s controllability than random attack (see Fig. 3b,c,d). Moreover, random upstream
attack typically is more efficient than random downstream attack, even though in both cases
we remove more hubs and more links than in the random attack. This is due to the fact
that the upstream (or downstream) neighbors are usually more (or less) “powerful” than
the node itself.
The efficiency of the random upstream attack is even comparable to targeted attacks
(Fig. 3). Since the former requires only the knowledge of the network’s local structure
rather than any knowledge of the nodes’ centrality measures or any other global informa-
tion (i.e. the structure of the A matrix) while the latter rely heavily on them, this finding
indicates the advantage of the random upstream attack. The fact that those targeted at-
tacks do not always show significant superiority over the random attack and the random
upstream (downstream) attack could be due to an overlap effect — two targeted nodes suc-
cessively chosen from the rank list based on some centrality measure are likely to have larger
overlap between their controllable subspaces than two randomly chosen nodes. Therefore,
successively removing targeted nodes with highest centralities will not always cause the most
damage to the network’s controllability. Random attacks can avoid such overlap to some
extent because the removed nodes are randomly chosen. This also explains why sometimes
targeted attacks are worse than the random attack (see Fig. 3a). Notice that for the intra-
organization network all attack strategies fail in the sense that δ is either positive or very
close to zero (Fig. 3a). This is due to the fact this network is so dense (〈k〉 ≈ 58) that
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we have Cc(i) = Cc(j) = N for almost all the edges (i → j). Consequently, both random
upstream and downstream attacks are not efficient and the Cc-targeted attack shows almost
the same impact as the random attack. This result suggests that when the network becomes
very dense its controllability becomes extremely robust against all kinds of attacks, consis-
tent with our previous result on the core percolation and the control robustness against link
removal [12]. We also tested those attack strategies on model networks (see Supplementary
Material Sec.III.C). The results are qualitatively consistent with what we observed in real
networks.
In sum, we study the control centrality of single node in complex networks and find that
it is related to the underlying hierarchical structure of networks. The presented results help
us better understand the controllability of complex networks and design an efficient attack
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FIG. 1: Control centrality. (a) A simple network of N = 7 nodes. (b) The controlled network
is represented by a directed graph G(A,B) with an input node u1 connecting to a state node
x1. The stem-cycle disjoint subgraph Gs (shown in red) contains six edges, which is the largest
number of edges among all possible stem-cycle disjoint subgraphs of the directed graph G(A,B)
and corresponds to the generic dimension of controllable subspace by controlling node x1. The
control centrality of node 1 is thus Cc(1) = 6. (c) The control centrality of the central hub in a
directed star is always 2 for any network size N ≥ 2. (d) The control centrality of a node in a
directed acyclic graph (DAG) equals its layer index. In applying Hosoe’s theorem, if not all state
nodes are accessible, we just need to consider the accessible part (highlighted in green) of the input
node(s).
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FIG. 2: Distribution of normalized control centrality of several real-world networks
(blue) and their randomized counterparts: rand-ER (red), rand-Degree (green). (a)
Intra-organizational network of a manufacturing company [38]. (b) Hyperlinks between weblogs
on US politics [39]. (c) Email network in a university [40]. (d) Ownership network of US corpora-
tions [41].
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FIG. 3: The impact of different attack strategies on network controllability with
respective to the random attack. δ ≡ [rankStrategy−jg (C′) − rankRandomg (C′)]/N with
rankStrategy−jg (C′) represents the generic dimension of controllable subspace after removing a P
fraction of nodes using strategy-j. The nodes are removed according to six different strategies.
(Strategy-0) Random attack: randomly remove P fraction of nodes. (Strategy-1 or 2) Random
upstream (or downstream) attack: randomly choose P fraction of nodes, randomly remove one of
their upstream neighbors (or downstream neighbors). The results are averaged over 10 random
choices of P fraction of nodes with error bars defined as s.e.m. Lines are only a guide to the eye.
(Strategy-3,4, or 5) Targeted attacks: remove the top P fraction of nodes according to their control
centralities (or in-degrees or out-degrees).
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